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The October Revolution
The Revolution of 5 October is the third such event 
in Kyrgyzstan’s recent history (the previous ones 
took place in 2005 and 2010). As in the previous 
cases, the revolution was the result of a combi-
nation of overlapping problems at several levels: 
opposition to the centralisation of power in the 
hands of the president and his circles and the fix-
ing of elections, in addition to tensions between 
different groups of interests, usually with regional 
and tribal links (following the basic division of the 
country into the North and the South), that faced 
accusations of being implicated in organised crime. 
Traditionally, the main political forces try to play 
off the international actors present in Kyrgyzstan 
(Russia and China which replaced the US at least 
a decade ago) against each other. Consecutive 
political crises, stimulated by social and economic 
issues, have weakened the constitutional and 
legal orders of the country while also acting as 
a spark for igniting local social tensions (an ex-
treme example of this being the pogroms against 
the Uzbek minority in the south of the country in 
2010). On the other hand, these recurrent crises 
bear witness to the existence of a pluralist po-
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On 15 October Kyrgyzstan’s president, Sooronobay Jeenbekov, resigned from his position and his 
duties were taken over by the opposition leader, Sadyr Japarov. The change in power was brought 
about by large-scale protests which broke out on 5 October, the day after the election; subsequently 
the protesters took over the main buildings of the central administration in Bishkek and released op-
position leaders who had been imprisoned (among them Japarov). The demonstrations, which were 
forceful but not long-lasting, resulted in a compromise of sorts which led to changes in the highest 
state positions, the announcement of an early presidential election and a rerun of the parliamentary 
election.
Despite the situation in the country (particularly in the capital) having been restored to one of 
relative stability, Kyrgyzstan is still struggling with grave problems: a crisis of the political system, 
social tensions and a dismal economic situation that is further exacerbated by the implications of 
the COVID-19 pandemic. The current state of affairs presents a serious challenge both for Russia and 
China, whose respective interests have an important impact on the politics of Kyrgyzstan and the 
entire region of Central Asia.
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litical culture within Kyrgyzstan, whose society 
possesses informal but effective mechanisms of 
self-regulation. 
This last violent change of power is a manifestation 
of the willingness of the elites from the North 
to stop the authoritarian ambitions of President 
Jeenbekov with the use of social protests. Japarov, 
who has suddenly emerged as the opposition 
leader, is a politician with strongly nationalist 
(also anti-Uzbek) and populist views (for example, 
he called for foreign investments to be national-
ised). He has been active in politics both at the 
regional and central levels. Japarov has faced 
accusations of having ties with criminal social 
networks, and when the revolution erupted he 
was serving a sentence of over 11 years of im-
prisonment for abducting a representative of 
the local government and holding him hostage. 
Japarov came to power thanks to huge pressure 
from the protesters and President Jeenbekov’s 
compromise-based approach to solving the crisis 
(he declared he was willing to share power and 
rerun the election, then he withdrew from the 
race following a unilateral correction of the terms 
and conditions of the agreement) – bypassing the 
normal constitutional procedures. 
Japarov assumed the position of prime minister 
and then became acting president of the coun-
try, thus consolidating full executive powers in 
his hands. Following the announcements made, 
the present parliament is still operating. A con-
stitutional referendum has been scheduled for 
11 December and an early presidential election 
is planned for 10 January 2021. 
The new power and new challenges
The present normalisation of the situation (in 
particular in the capital), the effective handover 
of power and the outlining of a road map for its 
legalisation are Japarov’s first and fundamental 
successes. A surprisingly reformatory and con-
ciliatory tone to the declarations regarding his 
political manifesto represents the second step 
towards the stabilization, since the manifesto 
addresses the concerns expressed by minorities 
(primarily the Uzbek minority) and includes an 
announcement of decisive measures to be taken 
to combat corruption and organised crime (almost 
immediately, some extraordinary arrests of several 
high-profile individuals were carried out). The fact 
that Japarov recognised the present parliament 
(established following the election that ignited 
the protests) and the majority of the ministers, 
and that he also made several appointments to 
ministerial positions from outside his inner cir-
cle, indicates an approach aimed at preserving 
the current situation. One such example was the 
appointment of Japarov’s political partner from 
the South, Kamchybek Tashiev, as the head of the 
State Committee for National Security. 
Irrespective of the new government’s declarations 
and the implications of the measures undertaken 
for its image, the question about their genuine 
impact remains an open one. It will be extremely 
difficult for Japarov himself to prove that he is 
capable of guaranteeing the legal order in the 
country and can rid himself of the charges of 
being tied to organised crime. He faces similar 
problems with the concerns of minorities (mainly 
the Uzbek minority), since both Japarov and the 
new head of the special services, Tashiev, have 
been directly accused of being co-responsible 
for the pogroms of the Uzbek minority in 2020 
(the verdicts on these cases affected few of the 
people directly involved in the pogroms). 
However, at the deepest level, the most serious 
challenges the new government is confronted 
with are systemic social and economic issues, at 
present exacerbated by the upheaval following the 
present revolution, among them the implications 
of the COVID-19 pandemic and the substantial 
consequences of the breakdown of mass-scale 
financial migrations to Russia. It is estimated that 
approximately 200,000 Kyrgyz labour migrants 
The crisis in Kyrgyzstan presents 
a challenge to the region of Central 
Asia and to both Russia and China, 
whose respective interests have 
an important impact on Bishkek’s 
politics. 
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have been forced to return home from Russia, 
and that they were in great part the driving force 
behind the recent events and remain a potential 
source of further social tensions.
The international dimension 
The victorious revolution, as was the case for the 
previous ones, presents a serious challenge to re-
gional politics. Above all, the regularity and effec-
tiveness of such events in Kyrgyzstan contradicts 
the authoritarian models followed in Central Asia 
and also implemented by Russia and China. The 
Kyrgyz protests constitute a dangerous precedent 
in the context of social tensions in neighbouring 
states, and the volatility of Kyrgyzstan’s legal 
order presents a threat to external investments 
and interests, ranging from gold mines controlled 
by Canadian capital (which Japarov once wished 
to nationalise) to Chinese investments. The final 
challenge (but not the least important) arises from 
the growing likelihood of an eruption of nation-
alist sentiments in Kyrgyzstan; in the past these 
mostly affected minorities, particularly the Uzbeks 
constituent, but also the Dungans, Russians, Kurds 
and other. They also manifest themselves in border 
disputes with Tajikistan (there are regular border 
incidents which involve law enforcement officers 
from both countries and result in casualties on 
both sides). 
All these social tensions present a fundamental 
challenge to Russia, which treats Kyrgyzstan as 
being within its sphere of political influence and 
responsibility, and this approach is generally ac-
cepted both in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia, as 
well as in China. 
On the one hand, Russia’s relative passivity and 
limited agency (compounded by the current lim-
ited capacity to influence Bishkek by regulating 
labour migrations) in this type of political crises 
undermine its authority. On the other hand, they 
are even more acute for China, which has a de-
cidedly weaker impact on political and security 
issues in Kyrgyzstan than Russia. 
The outlook 
It should be expected that Japarov will ensure a rel-
ative stabilisation of the situation in the country 
and will effectively legalise his power, since he has 
shown himself to be fairly competent at handling 
the situation to date. Among the measures un-
dertaken, he announced that he would resign in 
order to legally stand in the presidential election 
in January 2021. However, it remains disputable 
to what extent his reforms have genuine impact 
and whether democratisation can be sustained, 
particularly in the face of the informal societal 
structures which he makes use of and the various 
charges linking him to the criminal underworld. 
It is difficult to gauge how the situation will fur-
ther unfold in the uncertain, poor and densely 
populated south of the country, where influential 
clans of Jeenbekovs and Matraimovs and the 
Uzbek minority still play important roles. 
Kyrgyzstan remains part of Russia’s sphere of in-
fluence and its new government is conspicuously 
seeking to obtain support from this side. However, 
Russia has increasingly serious problems with 
effectively managing crises on the peripheries of 
the former Soviet Union, as is also exemplified – 
apart from the ongoing crisis in Kyrgyzstan – by 
the current tensions in Belarus and Nagorno-Kara-
bakh. Kyrgyzstan’s chronic instability and the fact 
that the country has a border with China’s fragile 
autonomous region of Xinjiang may eventually 
lead to China’s active involvement in its neigh-
bour’s problems.
